Increased accuracy is a common justification for using groups, rather than individuals, to make judgments. However, the empirical literature shows that groups excel as judges only under limited conditions. Hill's (1982) review found that groups tend to perform around the level of the second best member in most tasks, including group judgment. Hastie (1986) identified several task differences that moderate the relative accuracy of group and individual judges, but he also concluded that there were few, if any, task conditions under which groups consistently outperformed their members. Groups performing "eureka" tasks (Laughlin, VanderStoep, & Hollingshead, 1991) , tasks with demonstrable solutions, tend to outperform their average members and approach the performance of their best members. When one or two group members can demonstrate or effectively justify the correct answer to the rest of the members, the group will usually make a correct judgment. On the other hand, groups performing tasks that involve solutions that are not easily demonstrable tend to perform at the level of their average members. Thus, the accuracy of group judgment depends greatly on the nature of the judgment task.
Most of the research on group accuracy has addressed the following simple question: Are groups more or less accurate judges than individuals? In this review, we dig a bit deeper and explore a few essential theoretical and practical issues leading to insights about the underlying causes of group judgment accuracy. We focus on the accuracy of quantity judgments made by interacting small groups. These tasks are especially congenial to analyses of accuracy and provide a clear context in which to introduce analytic frameworks.
Our focus on accuracy, especially quantitative judgment accuracy, means that we have set aside other measures of group Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, Psychology Department, University of Colorado.
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Gigone, who is now at Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Box 90120, Durham, North Carolina 27708-0120. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to gigone@mail.duke.edu. judgment quality. We do not cover increased commitment to action, solution creativity, problem-solving ability, or other measures of group output quality. Neither do we discuss group process quality and the issue of qualitative choice accuracy. We are also concerned primarily with group judgment accuracy across multiple judgments. "One shot" judgment studies allow the measurement of only one criterion-judgment discrepancy; but tasks in which a single group (or individual) makes several judgments provide much more information about the magnitude and source of judgment errors. For example, multiple judgments support the attribution of error discrepancies to random error or to systematic biases.
Judgment accuracy can be characterized in even greater detail when the informational resources of the judge are known. If we know what information goes into a group's judgments, we can infer a great deal about the link between that information and the group's judgment accuracy. The researcher can be reasonably certain about what information is used to make a judgment only when he or she provides that information to the judge. However, most laboratory and applied judgment tasks involve judgments based on pre-existing knowledge or on information that is difficult to quantify. Thus, we pay special attention to tasks in which the informational resources are known because of the additional resolution that they provide in identifying the sources of judgment errors. Table 1 summarizes the relevant published research since Hastie's (1986) review of the area. We have included in our review only those reports of studies of interacting groups making several consensus judgments for which there were explicit, defensible accuracy criteria (at least as determined by expert opinion; Hastie & Rasinski, 1987) . In addition to listing the citations. Table 1 summarizes the participants, group size, judgment task, and accuracy measurements used in each study. The table emphasizes the variety of tasks and measures, which makes it difficult to frame valid generalizations and comparisons between studies. Moreover, the majority of the published reports did not include the information necessary to compute a standardized measure of group judgment accuracy. Without such information, it is impossible to describe or compare the typical levels of accuracy of group judgments. To compare group judgment accuracy with individual judgment accuracy has always been the primary goal of most of the group judgment accuracy studies. The column labeled Baselines in Table 1 lists the individual accuracy baselines with which group accuracy was compared in each study. Those baselines include the mean accuracies of individual judgments, mean individual judgments, most accurate individual judgment, and randomly selected individual judgments. In most cases, these baseline judgments were rendered by the group members prior to their group judgments. Thus, these studies provide useful within-group assessments of accuracy, but the variety of measures and comparisons makes summary difficult.
Recent Empirical Literature
We argue later in this article that comparisons of group and individual judgment accuracy should include a measure of the effect size of the accuracy difference between group and individual judgments. Only a few of the reviewed studies include any indication of the magnitude of the accuracy difference. Moreover, few of the studies reported sufficient information (e.g., both condition means and standard deviations) to compute the R 2 statistic that we conclude is the most useful general summary.
Therefore, we used an effect size measure in Table 1 that we have called the comparison ratio (CR). The CR is equal to the difference between the mean accuracy of the group judgments (whichever accuracy measure was used in the study) and the mean accuracy of a particular individual judgment baseline (e.g., the most accurate member judgment), divided by the mean group judgment accuracy. Thus, the CR indicates the proportion of the group judgment accuracy by which the group is more (or less) accurate than the individual judgment accuracy baseline, on average. Although it is far from ideal, this index provides a means for making generalizations across, and comparisons between, studies. Because the tasks and analyses vary greatly across studies, we do not focus on detailed comparisons between the different studies. Our focus in this review is on common research habits rather than on the shortcomings of particular studies. In one of the first studies summarized in Table 1 , Harmon and Rohrbaugh (1990) asked 3-to 6-member groups of undergraduates and a sample of individuals to predict the order of finish of horses in horse races, on the basis of five informational cues (e.g., post position). Participants judged the finishing order of six horses in each of seven races for a total of 42 judgments, although judgments within a race were dependent on one another. Groups were assigned to three conditions; the conditions varied in the amount of feedback members received about their own and other members' judgment policies. Judgment accuracy was measured as the correlation between the group's (or individual's) judgment policy and the actual finishing positions of the horses. The feedback conditions did not vary in accuracy (mean r -.27). Group accuracy was worse than the accuracy of the most accurate group member (mean r = .33) but was not significantly different from that of the second most accurate group member.
Henry (1993) studied 3-member groups of undergraduates. Judges answered nine general knowledge questions with quantitative answers (e.g., the length of the Nile River). Judgment accuracy was measured as the percentage of absolute error (PAE) on each question. Group-individual comparisons were made at both the question and group (averaged across the nine questions) levels; the former comparisons were not statistically independent within groups. On 82.2% of the questions, the accuracy of the group was greater than the mean accuracy of its members (in contrast to the accuracy of the mean member judgments). Groups were more accurate than the most accurate member on 40.7% of the questions. When judgment accuracy is averaged across questions, the accuracy of 9 of 15 groups was greater than the mean accuracy of their members; 5 groups were more accurate than their most accurate member.
In a similar study, Henry (1995) added two different group process interventions: instructing the group to determine the most accurate member and instructing the group to share the most relevant information. Again, undergraduate participants were assigned to 3-member groups. Individuals and then groups answered 10 quantitative general knowledge questions. Group accuracy was measured as the frequency of group judgments (out of 10) that were more accurate than the best (most accurate) member judgment (M = 3.35) and as the frequency of group judgments that were more accurate than the median member judgment (M = 5.02). These relative accuracy comparisons do not provide information about the magnitude of the judgment errors of either individuals or groups. Groups receiving either intervention were more accurate than free-discussion groups, and group accuracy did not differ between interventions. Libby, Trotman, and Zimmer (1987) looked for factors that might influence between-group differences in group judgment accuracy. Participants were 57 experienced loan officers in 3-mernber groups. Thirty participants were randomly assigned to groups; the other 27 participants participated as experienced groups. The task involved predicting which companies would go bankrupt from a sample of 39 actual companies; 12(31.0%) of the firms had gone into bankruptcy. Participants received information about each company that comprised five financial ratios for each of the past 3 years. Libby et a), estimated that judges could achieve a maximum accuracy of 84.1 % if they used the information according to the most accurate linear model. On average, groups accurately predicted the fate of 30.9% of the companies, with no difference in accuracy between randomly assigned and experienced groups. Groups were more accurate than individuals, but group judgments were equal to the average individual judgment in accuracy and were less accurate than the best member judgment. The (positive) difference in accuracy between group judgments and mean individual judgments was correlated with the within-group variation in individual judgment accuracy and with the ability of the group to recognize the most accurate individual judge. Sniezek (1989) compared the judgment accuracy of groups undergoing each of three group process interventions and groups performing as freely interacting groups (the process manipulation was within groups). Five-member groups of undergraduates performed four different sales forecasting problems. They received a graph of sales over the 14 previous months (but no other judgment-relevant information) and were asked to predict the next month's sales. Judgment accuracy was measured as the PAE but was reported as mean PAE reduction relative to the mean of the members' judgments. On average, the PAE of the group judgments was 3.0% lower than the PAE of the mean of the members' judgments. However, the PAE of the best members' judgments was 11.6% lower than the PAE of the mean of the members' judgments.
In a similar study (Sniezek, 1990) , 5-mernber groups of undergraduates predicted five financial variables, based on timeseries data for each variable. Groups were assigned to four conditions (three group process interventions and freely interacting groups). Judgment accuracy was measured as both squared error and bias (the signed difference between judgment and criterion). Means were reported only for three of the five judgments (the other two judgments showed no accuracy differences); results were reported separately for each of the three judgments. In general, the judgments of interacting groups were more accurate than the judgments of a randomly selected member, less accurate than the judgments of the most accurate member, and no different from the mean of the members' judgments. Results were similar for both accuracy measures. Sniezek and Henry (1989) studied 3-member groups of Master's of Business Administration (MBA) students; individuals and then groups judged the frequency of 15 different causes of death. Members of the most accurate groups received monetary awards. Accuracy was measured as PAE; geometric means were compared, reportedly to correct for skewed distributions. Group judgments were more accurate than mean individual judgments, particularly for the low-frequency causes of death. A substantial percentage of the group judgments (28.5%) were outside the range of the corresponding member judgments-an uncommon finding that may be the result of some unknown property of the fatality judgment task.
In another study, Sniezek and Henry (1990) looked at judgments of automobile prices. Each 3-member group judged the list price of each of 15 types of automobile. Participants were MBA students and undergraduates. Again, members of the most accurate group received monetary awards. Four between-subjects conditions varied in the occurrence and order of prediscussion individual judgments, group judgments, and postdiscussion individual judgments. Judgment accuracy was measured as the mean PAE, averaged over the 15 judgments. Group judgments were more accurate than prediscussion member judgments (the accuracy of the mean of the member judgments was not reported). Again, many of the group judgments were out of range of the prediscussion member judgments; unlike those in the earlier study (Sniezek & Henry, 1989) , these out-of-range judgments were not more accurate on average than group judgments that were inside the range of the member judgments.
Following the work of Henry (1989, 1990) , Lim (1994) also used a car-price judgment task to study the judgments of 3-member groups of MBA students and undergraduates. Again, members of the most accurate groups were rewarded with monetary prizes. Accuracy was assessed as the mean PAE averaged across the 15 car-price judgments. Groups were assigned to six experimental conditions; the conditions varied in whether judgments, confidence intervals, or both were elicited before, after, or before and after group discussion. In general, the group judgments were more accurate than the initial individual judgments. No other accuracy baselines were reported. Miner (1984) conducted a study of 4-member groups of undergraduates. Unlike the situation in most of the studies reported here, participants were allowed to form their own groups within a classroom. Moreover, the study took place near the end of a semester-long introductory business course in which several group activities had taken place. Individuals and then groups completed a winter survival task in which they ranked the importance of 15 items (the judgments of four winter survival experts were used as the accuracy criteria). The absolute summed difference between the judgments and the criteria served as the accuracy measure. The best member judgments were most accurate on average, followed by the group judgments and then the judgments of the member selected by the group as most accurate. The initial individual judgments were the least accurate.
Reagan-Cirincione (1994) performed the only study reported here in which group judgments were more accurate than the mean individual judgment (in contrast to the mean accuracy of individual member judgments). In her study, 4-and 5-member groups of students completed two different judgment tasks. Students judged the average public teacher salaries of all 50 states and the number of games won during a season by each of 50 baseball teams. In both tasks, participants received several informational cues (e.g., a state's total expenditures on education, the total number of bases stolen by a team during the season). The study included an intensive group process intervention that involved cognitive feedback (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinmann, 1986 ) and a computerized group decision support system. The accuracy measure was the correlation between the criteria and the predictions of the individual's or group's judgment policy. Group judgments were more accurate, on average, than both the statisticized group (mean of member) judgments and the best member judgments. With the help of process interventions, groups showed considerable process gain (Steiner, 1972) . Michaelsen, Watson, and Black (1989) conducted a study to demonstrate their claim that group judgment accuracy would improve, relative to individual judgment accuracy, if studies used more natural groups, judgment tasks, and settings. They used 222 learning teams with 3 to 8 members (A/ = 5.97). Participants were students from organizational behavior courses. During the semester, they participated in a number of group problem-solving tasks. A series of six individual and group tests provided the judgment data; each test had 12-18 true-false and multiple-choice questions. Cumulative individual and group scores (percentage of correct answers) were used as judgment accuracy measures. Groups answered 89.9% of the questions correctly, on average. Michaelsen et al. claimed that all 222 groups outperformed the average member and that 215 groups outperformed the best member. However, they mistakenly compared the group cumulative accuracy with the average and best member cumulative accuracies rather than with the accuracy of the average and best answers on each individual question. Thus, the superior accuracy of the group judgments can be attributed to the error-cancelling effect of combining individual judgment rather than to the group judgment process (Michaelsen, Watson, Schwartzkopf, & Black, 1992; Tindale & Larson, 1992a , 1992b . Watson, Michaelsen, and Sharp (1991) applied the same method in a follow-up study that is also weakened by their equivocal method of analysis. Again, they used as participants learning teams composed of graduate students enrolled in an organizational behavior course. A total of 272 students participated in fifty 5-and 6-member groups. Again, accuracy consisted of cumulative performance on a series of individual and group exams. As in the earlier study (Michaelsen et al., 1989) , nearly all groups (98.0%) were more accurate overall than the most accurate member. However, as before, Watson et al. did not show that groups outperform individuals at the level of the single test (let alone the single question). Their results again could have been attained without any group interaction (Tindale & Larson, 1992a , 1992b . Tindale and Larson (1992a) performed a small-scale replication of the Michaelsen et al. (1989) study to clarify the misinterpretations of the latter researchers. Participants were students in a personnel psychology course; they were divided into eight groups of 3 to 5 members. Scores from three quizzes provided accuracy data. When the scores were cumulated over all quiz answers, group accuracy relative to individual accuracy was similar to that in the earlier study. At the level of the individual quiz question, however, no group correctly answered a question that had been answered incorrectly by all of the group's members. The replication demonstrates the error of interpreting a comparison between judgment accuracy of the group and judgment accuracy of a single member (e.g., the best member overall) as a comparison showing the accuracy of a statisticized baseline (e.g., the best member for each judgment). Stasson and Bradshaw (1995) performed another replication of the Michaelsen et al. (1989) study. Participants were 91 introductory psychology students assigned to either an individual-participant control condition (« = 39) or a 5-member group condition (n = 52 in 5-member groups). Participants completed a five-item test of mathematical concepts. Groups were more accurate than the control individuals, on average. In addition, groups were more accurate than their best member overall. As in the Tindale and Larson (1992a) study cited above, however, groups were less accurate than the best member for each problem. Groups chose the correct answer in 9 of the 32 cases in which no group member had chosen the correct answer. However, groups chose the incorrect answer in 31 of the 228 cases in which at least 1 group member had chosen the correct answer. Thus, groups suffered more from their inability to identify a correct member's answer than they gained from their ability to choose a correct answer when all of their members had chosen incorrect answers.
Let us summarize the findings of the studies that we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs. For the most part, group judgments tend to be more accurate than the judgments of typical individuals, approximately equal in accuracy to the mean judgments of their members, and less accurate than the judgments of their most accurate member. Only one study (Reagan-Cirincione, 1994) reported group judgments as being more accurate than the mean of the members' judgments. That study included an elaborate group process manipulation. In addition, the accuracy measure was the correlation between the predictions of linear models of the criteria and the judgments (G), which disallowed differences in judgment variability between groups and individuals. The judgment tasks in which groups can consistently outperform individual judges may therefore be extremely limited. These results echo Hastie's (1986) conclusions concerning groups performing "judgmental" tasks. However, we argue in the following sections that better and more consistent G1GONE AND HAST1E analytic procedures yield more discerning conclusions and identify the exceptional circumstances of greatest theoretical and practical significance.
Description of Inaccuracy
A measure of judgment accuracy requires a comparison between judgments and criteria representing the truth. Ideally, the to-be-judged entities possess a measurable quantity on the relevant dimension. Comparisons with a concrete criterion yield measures that include only measurement error; there is virtually no uncertainty in the criterion itself. A knowledgeable judge could achieve nearly perfect judgments. In other cases, out of necessity, the criteria may be subjective. For example, the criteria might be judgments of experts or consensus judgments of another group of judges. Subjective criteria do not fundamentally alter the way in which accuracy is measured. However, the subjectivity is likely to add error ("irreducible uncertainty"; Hammond, 1996) to the criteria, and even the best (noncriterion) judge would not be able to achieve perfect accuracy. If judgments are to be used as criteria, they should be averaged across several different judges so that the unsystematic error will cancel out.
This "correspondence" view of accuracy can be distinguished from a "coherence" view of accuracy (Hammond, 1996; Hastie & Rasinski, 1987) . In the latter case, the standard of comparison is derived from principles of rational judgment. For example, researchers who study the use of base rates by groups rely on Bayes's theorem for their standards (Edwards, 1968; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . Although such studies provide legitimate evaluations of group judgment quality, they do not directly address group judgment accuracy.
Measurements of group judgment accuracy (and individual accuracy) are usually either correlational or distance measures. Distance from the truth, really an index of inaccuracy, lends itself to measurement. Correlational accuracy measures are easily refrained in inaccuracy terms; they indicate how much judgment variation remains when one controls for the linear relationship between judgments and criteria. How much do group judgments differ from the truth? And why do group judgments differ from the truth? Both of these questions require a good measure of judgment error.
Distance measures of accuracy start with the difference between a judgment and a criterion, averaged across judgments. The mean absolute error (MAE) measures the mean magnitude of differences between judgments and criteria. Absolute error depends both on the magnitude of the errors and on the units involved. Often a standardized measure is useful when comparisons are made, especially across criteria varying in magnitude. A common standardized measure is the mean PAE, where each absolute error is divided by the criterion, and the magnitude of the error is thereby scaled according to the magnitude of the criterion. The mean square error (MSE) also provides a measure of distance accuracy. The MSE has intuitive appeal in that it punishes extreme errors. In addition, unlike MAE, MSE can be algebraically related to correlational accuracy in a manner that we discuss below. MSE must also be standardized if it is to have anything but relative meaning. One such method of standardization, skill scores, is discussed below.
A correlational measure indicates to what extent differences between criteria are matched by differences between judgments. The simplest such measure is the achievement correlation (r a ), the correlation between judgments and criteria across judgments. The squared achievement correlation (r^) measures the proportion of variation in criteria that is "explained" by the linear relationship between judgments and criteria. Subtracting the latter value from 1 provides the proportion of variation in judgments that is not related to variation in the criteria. Correlational measures do not say anything about the relative magnitudes of judgments and criteria. A perfect correlation between judgments and criteria could result from judgments whose magnitude is significantly different from that of the criteria they aim to match.
Some researchers have used the intraclass correlation coefficient as a measure of accuracy, but the coefficient is not itself a measure of judgment accuracy (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) . Rather, it measures the interrater reliability of multiple judges over multiple targets. Judgment consensus, in the form of interrater reliability, may be related to but does not imply judgment accuracy (Ashton, 1985) . A single (individual or group) judge's reliability, in terms of consistent use of information, is a component of correlational accuracy. The latter relationship is discussed in more detail later in this article.
Accuracy measures that do not fall into either of the categories above, such as the number of exactly correct judgments, provide no information about the magnitude or nature of judgment inaccuracy. Although the frequency of errors may be a concern, magnitude of error will almost always be more informative.
In general, the MSE is the best of the accuracy measures above; usually it contains the most information. The achievement correlation accounts only for the strength of the linear relationship between judgments and criteria. It ignores the absolute distances between judgments and criteria. Similarly, the MAE discards information about discrimination between cases. It does not reward the judge's ability to match relative differences between criteria. The MSE, on the other hand, retains both types of information. Although it is technically a distance measure, it is affected by the correlational accuracy of the judgments because of the relationship between the correlation and the typical error magnitude. ludgments must have both a small distance inaccuracy and a small correlational inaccuracy to have a small MSE. The fact that the MSE punishes extreme errors also has value in applied settings. In many tasks, large errors are more than proportionally as important as small errors.
Illustrative Studies
As we noted, our focus is on the performance of small groups (3-15 members) making repeated estimates of quantities (e.g., prices, grades and other performance scores, historical dates). To promote clarity of exposition, we use two empirical group judgment studies (Gigone & Hastie, 1993 , 1996 to illustrate various points and calculations. In both studies, small ad hoc groups of college-student participants made judgments of 32 other (' 'target'') students' grades in an introductory psychology class. In order to compute accuracy values, the grade judgments were scaled such that a difference of one unit was equivalent to one grade "step" (e.g., the difference between a B and a B +). The targets' actual grades served as the criteria to assess accuracy.
Group members made individual judgments of a particular target and then discussed the target and made a group consensus judgment. The judges were provided with informational cues, such as the target's high school grade point average and his or her aptitude test percentile ranking. In three experimental conditions, group members did not share all of the information; for example, only 1 member might know the target's high school grade point average, 2 might know the aptitude test percentile ranking, and all 3 might know the attendance rate in the course. In the control condition, each group member received all of the cues before making his or her individual judgment. The two studies differed in the number of group members and the number of cues. Study 1 (Gigone & Hastie, 1993) involved 3-member groups who received six different cues. Study 2 (Gigone & Hastie, 1996) involved 7-member groups and 11 different cues. We use our analyses that investigate variations in accuracy across sharing conditions, between studies, and between individual and group conditions to illustrate the major approaches to studying accuracy.
In general terms, no difference is needed in how we quantitatively assess groups as judges and how we assess individuals as judges. The example data help to illustrate that point. Table 2 displays the mean values on three accuracy measures (MSE, MAE, and /•") for the individual members and the groups in the two example studies. The computation and interpretation of all of the accuracy measures are identical for the groups and the individuals.
The first thing to notice in the table is the differences between the shared-versus unshared-cues conditions. In both studies, accuracy is greater in the shared-cues condition than the unshared-cues condition. The difference can be seen on all three measures of accuracy. Thus, individual judges with only partial information are less accurate than individual judges with full information. More interesting, the same difference, albeit smaller, holds between groups whose members begin with partial information and groups whose members begin with full We found the effects above for all three judgment accuracy measures. In particular, there were accuracy differences on both the correlational and the distance measures. In terms of real data, then, why pay attention to different forms of accuracy? The example groups tended to be more or less accurate on all of the measures. Table 3 contains the Spearman rank order correlations between the different measures of individual and group judgment accuracy in Study 1 (top half of the matrixes) and Study 2 (bottom half of the matrixes). Only for the individual judgments in Study 2 does there appear to be any notable difference in the rank orders. Moreover, prior to calculating the correlations, we averaged the individual judgment accuracy measures across the members of each group in order to prevent data dependence between members of the same group. We might have found higher intermeasure correlations were we able to compute them across all of the individual judges.
In these studies, at least, the groups that had high correlational accuracy also tended to have low distance inaccuracy. In terms of determining which groups were "best," either type of measure would have sufficed. However, we have chosen to focus on the meaning of the accuracy measurements. For example, the mean of the MSE of the unshared information groups in Study 1 was 5.60. How good or bad is that amount of error?
Standardization of the accuracy measurements helps to provide some insight. We mentioned before that the PAE standardizes the MAE values on the basis of the magnitude of the criteria. Such a standardization would be useful when the criteria magnitudes have a large range and when the magnitude of typical errors is expected to correlate with the magnitude of the criteria. Such is not the case with the example grade judgment studies. In this case, an equally useful measure is the mean error as a percentage of the mean of the criteria. Across all of the groups in both studies, the mean of this percentage is 21.4, meaning that the typical (distance) error had a magnitude of about one fifth that of the mean criteria value (M = 8.81). Similarly, the mean PAE for the individual judgments was 23.7%.
The measure of correlational accuracy (r a ) has already been standardized according to the standard deviations of the judg-GK3ONE AND HAST1E How does a 21.4% distance error compare with a 14,5% improvement that is due to correlational accuracy? We can turn to a variation of the MSE for a value that accounts for both distance and correlational error.
Forecasting researchers distinguish between accuracy and skill (Stewart, 1990) . Accuracy is defined as the match between forecasts (judgments) and observed events (criteria). Skill refers to the comparison of the judgment accuracy to the accuracy of a reference judgment. For example, the accuracy of a group's actual judgments could be compared with the accuracy that would have resulted from making a constant judgment of the criteria mean. That is, we could compute the MSE of the criteria mean and use it as a baseline error. A skill score (SS) can be computed for the judgments of a group or individual as
where MSEj is the MSE of the actual judgments and MSE B is the MSE of the baseline judgments (the criteria mean). The skill score would be 1.0 for perfectly accurate judgments, 0.0 when the judgments were only as accurate as using the baseline criteria mean for each judgment, and a negative value if the actual judgments were worse than the baseline. Thus, the skill score serves as a standardization of the MSE accuracy measure, where the standard is the MSE of the criteria mean. Table 4 shows the mean skill scores of the group and individual judgments in the example studies. The striking rinding is the low judgment skill exhibited by both groups and individuals. The groups are on average judging with accuracy about equal to that of the baseline. The individuals are considerably less accurate than the baseline. At least in the specialized case where the mean of the criteria is known, judgments might even reduce the ability to accurately predict criteria values. In any case, it is now clear that high judgment accuracy in this grade judgment task does not mean that a high level of skill is being exhibited, either by individual judges or by groups.
Decomposition of Inaccuracy
When we chose the MSB as the most useful measure of judgment accuracy, we gave as one of our justifications that the MSE contains both distance and correlational accuracy components.
On the surface, this may seem to be a disadvantage of the MSE.
If a group makes judgments that yield a high MSE, we do not know whether the inaccuracy is due to a systematic bias in the mean of the judgments or to the lack of a correlation between criteria and judgments. Because the MAE and the r, are theoretically independent, the prudent course of action is to compute both measures. However, this combined approach has problems of its own. For example, if one group's judgments have a higher MAE than another group's, but the second group has a lower r a , how are we to decide which group was more accurate? By decomposing the MSE, we can deal with the problems of both approaches and learn a great deal about the nature of the judgment error.
The MSE can be decomposed into a number of mathemati- (Lee & Yates, 1992; Murphy, 1988; Stewart, 1990) . Ultimately, the choice of an appropriate decomposition rests on its usefulness, theoretically or practically, as a description of judgment error We focus on the Lee and Yates framework because we believe that it effectively elucidates the sources of accuracy and inaccuracy in the group judgment process. The simple form of their decomposition is expressed as
where Mj is the mean of the judgments, M c is the mean of the criteria, Sj is the standard deviation of the judgments, and S c is the standard deviation of the criteria. Equation 2 divides naturally into three terms, each of which describes an aspect of the judgment error. The first term of the equation,
represents the squared mean bias. The absolute value of the mean bias is not the MAE in our earlier discussion. Instead, it is the amount of systematic distance error in the judgments, either greater than or less than the mean of the criteria. The second term of the decomposition equation represents the squared variability bias. The MSB is also a function of the difference in variability between the judgments and the criteria. The final term relates the r a to the MSB. The lower the r,, the higher the MSB. However, the strength of that relationship depends on the variability of both the judgments and the criteria. Equation 2 shows the complex relationships among judgments, criteria, and error. The MSE is a quadratic function of the mean bias; larger systematic errors are "punished" more heavily. When variability is held constant, MSE is a negative linear function of r a , the nature of which is determined by the standard deviations of the judgments and the criteria. The relationship between variability and MSE is more complex. If the judgments and criteria are perfectly correlated (r, = 1.0), then maximum accuracy occurs when the variabilities of the judgment and criteria are equal.
1 In that case, MSE is a quadratic function of the difference between the two variabilities. However, when the correlation between judgments and criteria is less than perfect (r a < 1.0), the judgments should reflect regression to the mean. The judgments should have less variability than the criteria. Specifically, the error-minimizing relationship between the variabilities is Sj = r a S c .
Judgment standard deviations that are more or less than this adjusted value will lead to increases in MSE. Moreover, the effect of a difference from this optimal variability depends on the relative variabilities of the judgments and criteria. Table 5 illustrates the information that the MSE decomposition provides for the example individual and group judgments. The group judgments show little mean bias. Because different groups judged too high and other groups judged too low, the mean of bias means in the table are not equal to the difference between the criteria mean and the mean of judgment means. Because the mean bias is squared, a bias in either direction, positive or negative, adds to the group's MSE. The r a s were discussed earlier, in the coverage of correlational accuracy. The smaller the r a , the larger the MSE when variability is held constant. In the example studies, the mean standard deviations of the judgments are all smaller than the standard deviation of the criteria. Thus, the groups have negative variability biases, on average. Despite their negative biases, the judgments' standard deviations are in fact larger than their optimal values, given the values of r a (Equation 3). Therefore, larger standard deviations are associated with larger MSEs when everything else is held constant. Smaller variability biases are more than canceled out by the effect of regression to the mean. Neither differences in information sharing nor differences in the number of cues and group members affected any of the components of judgment error. It is not surprising, then, that the mean errors did not differ.
The picture of the individual judgments is again somewhat different from that of the group judgments. The mean of the mean biases did not differ between studies or conditions. However, the judgments of individuals in the full sharing conditions were less variable than those of individuals in the partial sharing conditions, F(\, 74) = 4.84, p = .03, partial r 2 = .06. In addition, the judgments of individuals in Study 1 were less variable than the judgments of individuals in Study 2, F( 1, 74) = 4.06, p -.047, partial r 2 = .05. The r a s were already shown to differ in the same pattern. Therefore, both higher judgment variability and lower correlational accuracy led individuals in the unshared-information conditions and in Study 2 to make less accurate judgments (as shown by their MSEs) than individuals in the shared-information conditions and in Study 1. The MSE decomposition shows that incomplete information and an increase in the number of cues led to both increased variability and decreased correlational accuracy in individual judgments. The group judgments, on the other hand, were not subject to either of these sources of inaccuracy.
The Case of Known Judgment Cues
Up to this point, we have looked only at the relationships between judgment and accuracy. The situation is somewhat more complex (and more interesting) when those judgments are based on a known set of informational cues. We can then explore the relationships between the group's combination of information into a judgment and its judgment accuracy (Lee & Yates, 1992; Stewart, 1990) . The key insight comes from the venerable tradition of analyzing judgment processes with Hammond's (1996) "lens model equation" (Cooksey & Freebody, 1985; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964; Stewart 1976 Stewart , 1988 . The basic assumption is that correlational accuracy can be decomposed in terms of environmental predictability, cue utilization, and judgment reliability. The lens model begins with symmetric linear models of both the environment (criteria) and the judgments of an individual or group. The environment linear model shows the relationships between the criteria and the set of cues; it is the best linear model of the environment on the basis of the cues that are available to the judge. The judgment model, usually called the "judgment policy," shows the linear relationships between the judgments and the cues; it is an "error-free" model of the judgments. Least squares regression models estimate both the environment model and the judgment policy. Note. MSE = mean square error; ra judgments).
; achievement correlation (between judgments and criteria across Although the following accuracy decomposition initially arose from the lens model, it applies to any judgment tasks involving multiple judgments from known cues. The lens model equation breaks down the achievement correlation as follows:
where G is the correlation between the predictions of the linear models of the environment and of the judge, R YX is the multiple correlation between the cues and the judgments, R nx is the multiple correlation between the cues and the criteria, and C is the correlation between the residuals of the linear models of the environment and of the judge. Thus, G represents the error-free accuracy of the judge, the r, that would result if the judgments were perfectly reliable and the criteria were perfectly predicted by the cues. However, that "perfect case" is moderated by the less than perfect predictability of the criteria (R 0 x < 1) and the less than perfect reliability of the judge (/J re < 1). If the environment and judgments are well described by a linear combination of the cues, then the correlation between the residuals from the two models (C) will be small, reducing the second term of the equation to near zero. 2 Thus, r a =» G X RrxR ox .
Finally, Equation 5 can replace r a in the MSE decomposition to give the following (Lee & Yates, 1992) :
In summary, the lens model helps us to decompose the MSE even further by breaking down correlational accuracy into contributions of environmental consistency (Sox), judgmental consistency (Ryu), and the match between the linear models of the environment and the judge (G), assuming a small value of C. The variables in Equation 6 help us to explore a number of new issues. For example, how closely does the group's judgment policy match the best linear model of the environment (G)? How well do the cues that are available to the group actually predict the criterion (Rox)^ How consistent is the group in the use of its judgment policy (/?y x )? The answers to these questions would help discriminate among qualitatively different interventions for improving group judgment accuracy. For example, if the group judgment policy is valid (G is high) but the group's application of that policy is inconsistent (R rx ), then some form of a bootstrapping method might be an effective tool. In addition, this decomposition emphasizes the importance of environmental predictability in limiting judgment accuracy. If the criteria are themselves only weakly related to the information that is available to judges, those judges will not make accurate judgments no matter how capable they might be.
The example studies again provide illustrations of analyses in terms of the lens model decomposition. Table 6 contains the mean parameter values for the lens model decomposition of r a for the individual and group judgments. We computed the best linear model of the environment for each study by regressing the criterion on the full set of cues (6 cues in Study 1 and 11 cues in Study 2). The R ax value for each study (computed as Note. G = error-free accuracy of the judge; R ox = multiple correlation between cues and criteria; Ryx = multiple correlation between cues and judgments.
the square root of the overall R 2 for the environment regression model) provides an approximate upper bound for correlational accuracy. If judges were correctly and consistently using the available cues, they would have been more accurate in Study 2 than in Study 1 because more (valid) cues were provided in Study 2. The potential accuracy difference is shown by the differences in R ox between the two studies. In truth, r a is higher in Study 1 for both group and individual judges. The G rows in Table 6 show that the difference is due to the use of judgment policies in Study 2 that are not as well matched to the cuecriteria relationships in the environment. Similarly, the differences in r a between individual judges in the unshared-cues and shared-cues conditions are primarily driven by the lower Gs in the unshared-cues conditions. When individuals received only a subset of the available cues, they were unable to apply valid judgment policies, even though they were able to apply their incorrect models with high consistency. In this task, at least, teaching judges the true relationships between cues and criteria would be a good step toward improved group and individual judgment accuracy.
Summary of the MSE Decomposition
In the example studies, we found reliable between-conditions and between-studies differences in the accuracy of the individual judgments but only small differences in the accuracy of the group judgments. The individual judgment accuracy differences are due to both greater judgment variability and lower correlational accuracy in the partial sharing conditions and in Study 2, which had more members per group and more cues. Moreover, the differences in correlational accuracy result from the use of judgment policies that differ in how well they match the true cue-criteria relations in the environment. Differences in the mean bias of the judgments or in the consistency with which judges applied their judgment policies do not play a role in the accuracy differences that we found.
At a more general level, the decomposition of the MSE identifies a number of factors that can mediate differences in judgment accuracy, whether those judgments are performed by individuals or by groups. The relationships between the judgment mean and the criterion mean and between the judgment variability and the criterion variability affect judgment accuracy; so do the validity of the cues available to the judge, the match between the judgment policy and the environment, and the consistency of the judge's application of that model.
Comparison of Group and Individual Judgment Accuracy
How should the comparison be made? Of course, most researchers are not interested in simply describing group judgment accuracy. Rather, they wish to compare the accuracy of group judges with some standard, typically the accuracy of individual judges. The usual research question is, Are group judgments more accurate than individual judgments?
To begin, the researcher must carefully consider what unit of analysis is appropriate for the comparison between group and individual judgments. It is clearly not enough to compare groups with single, individual judges. Statistical combinations of judgments have long been known to cancel out unsystematic judgment error (Hogarth, 1977) . The standard error of the mean of several judgments is smaller than the standard deviation of the judgments themselves; groups almost inevitably outperform their members simply by averaging those members' judgments. Such accuracy gains can hardly be attributed to anything special about the group judgment process; the group need not meet at all. Thus, individual judgments by themselves do not provide a particularly useful accuracy standard. Given uncorrelated member judgment errors, the group almost always performs better than individual judges, on average. This insight has led to the use of the judgment accuracy of various statisticized groups as a source of more informative comparison values for group judgments. Most commonly, the mean of as many individual judges as are members of the actual groups is used as the comparison statistic. Comparing the group judgment accuracy with the judgment accuracy of such a statisticized group renders it likely that any improvement by the groups results from more than error cancellation. Such a comparison directly addresses the (lack of) advantage of groups as judges, compared with individuals.
Group judgment accuracy can also be compared with the best (most accurate individual) member's judgment accuracy. If a single judge can make better judgments than the group as a whole, why convene the group at all? However, it is not easy to identify the member who initially makes the most accurate individual judgment (one exception would be in tasks with demonstrable solutions). In intellective tasks without demonstrable solutions, Henry (1995) found that, even when groups were instructed to identify their most accurate member, they were correct less than 50.0% of the time (although chance accuracy rates would be 33.0%). The mean of several individual judgments, on the other hand, can be computed prior to (or in place of) a group meeting. It is of more practical importance to determine (and improve) the merits of a group judgment relative to the generally less costly option of a statistical combination of individual judgments.
The use of the most accurate member as a benchmark involves an added complication when accuracy is computed across multiple judgments. The most accurate member can be identified either on each judgment or across all of the judgments. In the former case, a different member could be the most accurate on each judgment, depending on which of the members' judgments is closest to the criterion (only distance accuracy could be computed). Across all of the judgments, the individual judgment accuracy would be computed from the judgments of this hypothetical supermember, who is most accurate on every judgment. This is an illegitimate method of computing the benchmark; it capitalizes extensively on chance. It is more "fair" to the group to use as a benchmark the single member who was most accurate across all of the judgments, even if that individual was not the most accurate on every one of those judgments.
The mean within-group rank of the group judgment accuracy, relative to member judgment accuracy, provides more descriptive value than a simple comparison with the most accurate member. Such a statistic compares group judgment accuracy with the judgment accuracy of both the most accurate and median members (e.g., testing whether the mean group rank in a 3-member group is significantly different from M = 1.5 is an alternate test of the hypothesis that the group is more [or less] accurate than the most accurate member, on average). Moreover, the mean rank is itself descriptive of group performance. For example, a mean group rank in a 3-member group of M = 2.5 indicates that the group tends to be approximately as accurate as the second most accurate member. Of course, the mean ranking does not include any information about the amount by which the group tends to differ in accuracy from a particular member and is therefore most appropriate when the magnitude of accuracy differences is not of primary interest.
To return to the main thread of the argument, the most useful comparison uses the group's members themselves as the statisticized comparison group. That is, the members make individual judgments prior to meeting as a group, and those judgments are combined into a single value (e.g., the mean). The accuracy of the actual groups is compared with the accuracy of the statisticized groups (of the actual groups' members). Thus, the relevant comparison is within groups. Because all of the error in the comparison is within groups, the recommended test tends to have more statistical power than the corresponding betweengroups test. Moreover, it is a straightforward test of the research question. Is accuracy improved by making the judgment as a group? The within-groups comparison has both theoretical and practical advantages over a traditional between-groups design.
Again, any of the measures of accuracy we have cited can be applied to both group judgments and statistically combined individual judgments. It follows that any or all of the accuracy measures can be entered into the comparison of group accuracy above versus individual judgment accuracy. As always, multiple comparisons inflate the likelihood of finding statistically significant differences. The high correlations between the different accuracy measures exacerbate the problem; multiple accuracy comparisons should not be treated as independent tests. Instead, the most appropriate measure should be designated a priori. If a significant difference is found on that measure, further tests can help to describe the nature of the difference. In-line with our previous arguments, we advocate testing for group-individual differences on the MSB measure, with tests of the components of MSE (Equations 2 and 6) following a significant initial result.
Groups versus individuals: Example data.
It is again useful to use the data from our example studies to illustrate the approach that we are advocating. Let us begin with a comparison of group accuracy to "raw" individual accuracy (i.e., comparing the top and bottom halves of Table 2 ). Groups in both studies were more accurate than their constituent members, on average, on all three accuracy measures and regardless of whether or not the members received all of the cues prior to rendering their judgments (within-groupFs > 27.4,/?s < .001), with the exception of one test. In Study 1, when members received all of the information prior to making their individual judgments, the correlation accuracy of the group judgments was only marginally higher than that of the individual judgments, F( 1,6) = 4.75, p = .057. As was discussed earlier, these differences in group versus individual judgment accuracy could simply result from the cancellation of unsystematic error in the members' individual judgments in a relatively unsophisticated group judgment process.
Recall that the individuals who received full information were more accurate than those who received partial information. The same difference was not found for the group judgments. It seems to follow that the group versus individual accuracy difference should be larger for groups made up of members who received partial information than for groups made up of members who received full information. Such is the case; for example, the MSE accuracy difference between groups and individuals is significantly larger in the partial information conditions than in the full information conditions, F(l, 74) = 10.6, p = .002, partial r 2 = .13. The same pattern occurs for both absolute and correlational accuracy. Thus, the partial information groups do "catch up" to the full information groups in terms of judgment accuracy. But is any of the superior accuracy of groups relative to individuals due to anything beyond error reduction that results from an averaging of the members' individual judgments? Remember, our recommended approach to this question is to compare group judgment accuracy to the judgment accuracy of a statisticized group made up of the group's members, usually the mean of the members' judgments. Although the accuracy of the most accurate member could also serve as a benchmark for the Note. MSE = mean square error; MAE = mean absolute error; ra = achievement correlation (between judgments and criteria across judgments).
group, the accuracy of an a priori statistical combination of members' judgments provides a better comparison in terms of costs and benefits. Table 7 shows the accuracy of the mean of the members' judgments in the example studies. The first thing to note is the improvement in accuracy that results from taking the mean of the 3 or 7 members' judgments. On average, the statisticized group judgments are more accurate than the raw individual judgments on all three of the most popular accuracy measures (MSE, MAE, and r a ), in both studies, and for both the full information and partial information conditions (all within-group Fs > 24.1, ps < .002). The raw individual judgments include a significant amount of unsystematic error, at least some of which is canceled by the statistical combination of multiple judgments.
The accuracy advantage of statisticized individual judgments over raw individual judgments requires only that the inaccuracies of those individual judgments be unsystematic, not that they be truly random or of unknown cause. In the example studies, such unsystematic error could result from the unshared information received by members in the partial information conditions. For example, imagine that the partial information received by one member suggests a judgment higher than the criterion value and that the partial information received by another member suggests a judgment lower than the criterion value. In that case, a statistical combination of those individual judgments should result in a value that is nearer to the criterion than is either individual judgment. Thus, the cancellation of error can serve as more than a moderator of unknown causal influences; it can also serve to combine the judgment-relevant information "contained in" the different individual judgments.
Given that both the group judgments and the statisticized group judgments are more accurate than the raw member judgments, did the groups offer any boost in accuracy beyond the balancing of opposing errors? That is, were the group judgments more accurate than the statisticized group judgments? With regard to absolute accuracy and correlational accuracy, if we compare Tables 2 and 7, the differences between the group judgments and the statisticized group judgments are slight. No differences are significant for r, (all Fs < 2.\6,ps < .19). In Study 2, the fully informed groups were slightly less accurate in terms of MAE than were the statisticized groups made up of their members, F( 1, 6) = 7.29, p = .03. In general, group judgment accuracy and mean member judgment accuracy are very nearly the same in terms of either correlational or absolute (distance) accuracy.
The MSE accuracy measure paints a different picture. Groups tend to be less accurate than the mean of their members' judgments when accuracy is measured as MSE. The difference is statistically significant for 3 of the 4 sample groups: 3-member groups of partially informed members, F(\, 28) = 4.12, p = .03; 7-member groups of partially informed members, F( 1, 28) = 8.12, p = .008; and 7-member groups of fully informed members, F(l, 6) = 13.2, p = .008. Although the test is not significant for 3-member groups of fully informed members, no reliable differences were found between the two studies, the partially informed and fully informed members, or their interaction (largest F -2.44, p = .12). When groups are punished for errors of large magnitude, they fare worse than the mean of their members' individual judgments. Note. MSE = mean square error; ra = achievement correlation; G = error-free accuracy of the judge; R0x = multiple correlation between cues and criteria; RYX = multiple correlation between cues and judgments.
How can this occur, when the groups and the statisticized groups are nearly equal on all of the other accuracy measures? An answer can be found in the MSE decomposition (Equation 6). Tables 5 and 6 display the means of the MSE components for the group judgments, and Table 8 displays the means of the MSE components for the statisticized group judgments. The difference to note is in the relative variabilities (standard deviations) of the judgments. The group judgments in all conditions are more variable than are the statisticized group judgments. The judgment variability affects the MSE in two different components of the decomposition. The variability of the group judgments is nearer to the criteria variability, and therefore the variability bias of the group judgments is lower than the variability bias of the statisticized group judgments. This difference, with all else held constant, should lead to an accuracy difference favoring the group judgments-a finding in opposition to the present one.
However, recall that the judgment variability also appears in the final, correlational component of the decomposition. Because the correlation between judgments and criteria is less than perfect, the judgment variability reflects regression to the mean. The mean variability of the statisticized group judgments is itself larger than the ideal value (see Equation 3). Therefore, the higher variability of the actual group judgments adds to the problem. By moving even farther from the optimal variability, adjusted for regression to the mean, the groups actually perform worse than they would if they were to simply take the mean of their members' individual judgments. Thus, the groups exhibit an even more extreme version of the failure to render appropriately regressive judgments than do individuals (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996; Tindale, 1993) .
To summarize, group judgments are more variable than the mean judgments of their members. However, that increased variability is not accompanied by any increase in correlational achievement. Consequently, because the variability of the group judgments is not enough less than the criteria variability to account for regression to the mean, the groups tend to make errors of larger magnitude, leading to higher MSEs, on average. It remains to be seen whether or not our finding that group judgments are more variable than mean member judgments will generalize to other group judgment tasks.
Accuracy differences and effect magnitudes.
In the discussion of individual-group accuracy comparisons, we have to this point considered only the statistical significance of such accuracy differences. An exclusive focus on whether or not differences reach conventional levels of significance is a foolish one (e.g., Cohen, 1994) . It matters little that groups are or are not more accurate than individuals, in a statistical sense. Much is dependent on the power of any significance test, which is itself dependent on the number of groups in the study, the amount of error in the accuracy measurements (how much groups vary in accuracy), and the magnitude of the accuracy difference. It is this last factor that is of most interest. Therefore, the magnitude of any accuracy difference needs to be expressed in some meaningful and useful metric.
We recommend the computation and reporting of accuracy difference magnitudes. Reports of individual-group accuracy differences are next to meaningless without associated effect magnitudes. In applied settings, group judgments nearly always involve costs over individual judgments. Meetings need to be scheduled, meeting space arranged, and so on. What, then, are the benefits of those group judgments? Such calculations are impossible without a notion of how much better group judgments are than the baseline statistical combination of individual judgments.
Proportional reduction in error (PRE; Judd & McClelland, 1989) , equivalent to the more conventional R* in particular cases, provides a useful expression of the accuracy difference between groups and individuals. The PRE of the comparison between the group judgment accuracy and the baseline accuracy (e.g., statisticized group) is the most general expression of the difference magnitude. That value expresses the proportion of the variance (squared error) that is reduced by the mean difference between group and statisticized group accuracies, relative to a mean difference of zero. Because we also recommend a withingroups statistical test, the effect size is not usually "output" by statistical packages. However, it is easily computed from values that are included in the output (see Judd & McClelland, 1989) . The PRE provided by this test compares the mean accuracy difference with the variation in accuracy differences between groups. It quantifies the magnitude of the process gain (or loss) provided by group judgment.
The relative magnitude of the difference depends not only on the mean difference between groups and individuals but also on the amount of variation in that difference between groups. When differences between groups and individuals are not found, die culprit may be excessive error rather than the lack of an accuracy difference. In an applied context, interventions that foster more consistent, although relatively small, improvements in group accuracy may be just as important as those that foster large improvements in some, but not all, groups.
In our analysis of the illustrative studies, if we collapse across studies and conditions, the mean difference accounts for 18.4% of the total variation in group-member accuracy differences (PRE = .18). Recall that the groups were less accurate than the statisticized groups, on average. Therefore, the effect size above quantifies the accuracy advantage of the statisticized groups over the actual groups, relative to the total variation.
To summarize, the group judgments increase inaccuracy nearly 20.0% over the means of the members' judgments. The relative disadvantage of the groups comes out of their tendency to make more variable judgments. Thus, teaching judges to consider the consequences of regression to the mean or possibly even providing corrected judgments might be an effective intervention in this type of task.
Conditions Facilitating Group (Relative to Individual) Judgment Accuracy
In general, groups can improve over individuals by changing one or more of the components that make up the accuracy measure. The implications of this rather simple observation concern both the circumstances under which groups might be expected to outperform statistical combinations of individuals and the mechanisms through which such a performance could come about. It also suggests that there is a limited collection of judgment tasks in which groups have a legitimate opportunity to outperform individual judges.
Mean bias. Moving from left to right in the MSE decomposition equation (Equation 6), the first term is the squared mean bias across judgments. A group could outperform its members here if the mean of the group's judgments was nearer to the criteria mean than was the mean of the (statistically combined) member judgments. How could this come about? Imagine in the example studies that the unshared information always indicated (correctly) a higher grade than the shared information. In that rather unusual case, the mean member judgment tends to be negatively biased. However, if that unshared information was discussed, the group might debias its own judgments, which would result in higher accuracy. Note that this mean bias occurs across all judgments; tendencies for individuals to judge too high or too low on particular judgments shows up elsewhere in the decomposition equation.
Variability bias. Researchers have paid little attention to the role of judgment variability in group judgment accuracy. However, variability bias is unavoidably tied to correlational accuracy (/""); whether a decrease in variability bias will lead to improved accuracy depends on r a (see Equation 3 ). The optimal judgment variability (in terms of maximizing accuracy) is always less than or equal to the true variability in the criteria. The higher the r a , the closer the optimal judgment variability to the criteria variability. When the variability of the statisticized group's judgments is between the optimal value and the criteria variability (as in the example studies), then an increase in variability bias would actually he related to improved accuracy. In those instances, adjusting for regression to the mean is more important than matching the actual variability of the criteria (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) .
Given that the target variability is dependent on both the criteria variability and r a , how might the group make judgments that are closer to that value than are its members' judgments? The example studies suggest that group judgments tend to be more variable than member judgments. (The group polarization literature implies the same finding; Brown, 1986; Myers & Lamm. 1976 .) However, increased variability only leads to im-proved accuracy if the member judgment variability is below the criteria variability, adjusted for less than perfect correlational accuracy. Given the propensity of judges to ignore regression to the mean (Kahneman &Tversky, 1973) , an increase in judgment variability seems more likely to result in a decrease in accuracy, as in the example studies. The group might better aim at moderating the members' judgments by always adjusting toward the (expected) mean judgment, for example. In terms of a group judgment policy, that adjustment is equivalent to decreasing the weights on all of the judgment cues.
Reagan- Cirincione and Rohrbaugh (1992; Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977) have argued that systematic judgment error is an important influence on the difficulty of a group judgment task. If the accuracy of the most accurate member's judgment is the baseline accuracy, then the group is more likely to ' 'beat'' that baseline when individual judgments are unbiased. More specifically, if the mean of the individual judgments approximately equals the criterion, then the group will often be able to improve over its best member by simply averaging the members' judgments. When the individual judgment mean is biased, on the other hand, the best member will tend to outperform the group mean and the group will need to go beyond an equally weighted average of the members' judgments to outperform that best member. According to this view, the biased task is most informative in that it forces the group to cancel systematic error in the members' judgments to perform well, relative to the most accurate member.
We come to a similar conclusion concerning the importance of systematic judgment bias, although for somewhat different reasons. We argued above that for practical applications, the best member's judgment accuracy is usually an inappropriate baseline for group judgment accuracy. However, the mean of the members' judgments (the statisticized group judgment) is by definition affected by judgment bias. When the judgment is unbiased, the statisticized group judgment accuracy will be nearly perfect (only random error will keep the judgment from being equal to the criterion). In such a case, the group judgment can be only trivially more accurate than the statisticized group judgment. When the judgment is biased, on the other hand, the group can judge more accurately than the statisticized group. Depending on the nature of that systematic bias across judgments, it will inflate either the mean bias or the correlational error components when Equation 6 is computed for the statisticized group judgments. The group then has the opportunity to affect those components and therefore to improve on the statisticized group's performance. Thus, systematically biased individual judgments give the group room to beat its members.
Correlational accuracy. Finally, groups could achieve higher correlational accuracy (r a ) than members. Given known judgment cues, this could involve either of two mechanisms, an increase in the similarity of judgment policy and environment (G) or an increase in the consistency of use of that policy (# ra ; see Equation 6). The strength of the multivariate relationship between cues and criteria (Rax) is constant, as long as the known cues stay the same. Thus, the group must either use a more valid judgment policy, increasing G, or use its judgment policy more consistently, increasing # ra . To increase G, the group could adopt the judgment policy of its most accurate member, thus besting the judgment policy of the statisticized group. Of course, the group would need to have some way of identifying the most accurate member. Discussion might aid the group in identifying its most competent member (Einhorn et al., 1977; Henry, 1993 Henry, , 1995 Libby et al., 1987) . Of course, the strategy would succeed only if the most accurate member's judgment policy was more valid (had a higher G) than the statisticized groups' judgment policy. In order to increase RYX, the group could determine an explicit judgment policy that approximates the judgment policy of the statisticized group. Then the group could agree to the strict use of that policy. Alternately, if the group uses the same judgment policy as the statisticized group, but uses it more consistently, then the group's judgments will be more accurate than the statisticized group's judgments.
Previous reviews have identified several conditions for accuracy that involve the r a component. Hastie (1986) concluded that groups tend to be more accurate than individual judges when the task involved a eureka solution. In such an intellective task, especially with a demonstrable solution, a member is usually able to convince other members of the correct answer; the groups' behavior approximates a "truth wins" decision rule. How does this translate into the present analytical framework? First, the task must be one in which at least one of the members is likely to make the correct judgment of each to-be-judged object. In that case, the judgments of the most accurate (on each judgment) member will have a higher r a than will the judgments of a statisticized group. By following the judgment policy of the best member, then, the group can cut its judgment error relative to the statisticized group. Second, the group must be able to follow that more accurate policy; it must be able to recognize its most accurate member. By definition, the correct answer to a eureka task is demonstrable. In summary, groups tend to outperform individuals when the judgment policies of their most accurate members are both more accurate than the judgment policy of the statisticized group and discernible by other members.
All of the scenarios above assume that only one parameter in Equation 6 is changing at a time. In actuality, things are likely to be more complex. Any change in group process, for example, is likely to affect more than one parameter. Decreasing the variability of the judgments might have the unintended side effect of decreasing G and therefore decreasing r a . One advantage of the componential approach that we have described is its ability to isolate the possibly multiple effects of any intervention that aims to improve group judgment accuracy.
Accuracy and Group Judgment Processes
The discussion above suggests several relationships between group process and group judgment accuracy. Let us explore those relationships in a more systematic fashion. Figure 1 depicts a simple model of group judgment process (Gigone & Hastie, 1993 , 1996 . It draws on social judgment theory (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988) and is similar to Henry's (1989, 1990 ) "revision and weighting" model. It shares with the latter a relatively abstract level of description; group processes are described in terms of molar stages rather than molecular behavioral dynamics (cf. Stasser, 1988 that the stages are completely separable or that they necessarily occur in strict time sequence. However, the stages comprise the most important features of the group process that are relevant to judgment accuracy.
The leftmost section of the model represents the environment in which the judgments are performed. We assume that the judgments are based on a limited set of cues that are probabilistically related to the criteria. The strength of the relationship between cues and criteria determines the maximum predictability of the criteria. Environmental predictability limits accuracy; high accuracy can only occur when the information available to the judge (individual or group) is strongly related to the criteria.
Throughout this review, we have emphasized the formal equivalence of individual and group judgment accuracy. We continue this emphasis in our approach to the group judgment process and its influence on group judgment accuracy. The accuracy of a group's judgments is strongly determined by the accuracy of the group members' judgments. We know of no empirical work in which group accuracy was unrelated (or only weakly related) to member accuracy. Whenever measured, the correlation between group judgments and member judgments is high. With that in mind, we begin with the individual member's judgment accuracy as the primary determinant of group judgment accuracy.
We discussed the accuracy of individual judgments in detail in earlier sections. We argued that judgment accuracy can be described usefully in terms of the MSB decomposition. Correlational accuracy is limited by environmental predictability (R 0 x) and by judgment policy consistency (R t x)-If the available cues do not predict the criteria or if the individual does not use those cues consistently, then correlational accuracy will be low. The extent to which the individual's judgment policy models the environment (G) determines accuracy under conditions of perfect environmental predictability and perfect judgment policy consistency. Mean bias reflects systematic error, judgments that are consistently too high or too low; variability bias reflects unsystematic error, judgments that have a biased absolute magnitude. Finally, the extremity of a member's judgments should reflect regression to the mean that results from less than perfect correlational accuracy (Equation 3). Each member's judgments can be broken down into these components; a group's judgment accuracy depends fundamentally on the breakdowns of its members' judgment accuracies.
What happens to judgment accuracy when the group convenes and commences its discussion? Henry (1989, 1990) argued for a revision stage within the group judgment process, during which the members revise their initial opinions as a result of group discussion. For example, learning the opinions of other members during discussion may lead a member to adjust his or her own judgment. Sniezek and Henry (1990; see also Gigone & Hastie, 1993 , 1996 and Lira, 1994) found that only small revisions in member judgments resulted from group discussion without a group consensus requirement. Still, it is useful to consider how such revision could affect judgment accuracy.
Intuitively, group discussion involves the pooling of information (cues) and of individual judgments (Gigone & Hastie, 1993 , 1996 . The discussion of cues could provide a group member with previously unknown judgment-relevant information. The improvement in the member's judgment accuracy that might result from learning new information can be described in either of two (equivalent) ways. Learning new information can be thought of as a change in the environment; a previously unavailable cue is added to the model of the environment. Such a change would increase environmental predictability (R ox ). Alternatively, the cue, potentially available to all members, could be already included in the member's environment model. However, the member's judgment policy could not include (weight) the unknown cue; learning that information would increase the match (G) between the member's judgment policy and the envi-ronment model. Either change would result in improved correlational accuracy.
The discussion of members' judgments is most likely to lead to a convergence of opinions, whether toward a middle value or toward the opinion of one or more members (e.g., the subjective best member's judgment). The effect on accuracy of such convergence to a middle value depends on the correlation between members' errors across multiple judgments (Hogarth, 1977) . The weaker the correlation between errors, the greater the individual error reduction (across multiple judgments) resulting from such a convergence. The reduction of error in the individual member's revised judgments will result from a reduction in mean bias; on average, the member's judgment will be nearer to the criteria mean. Convergence to a single member's judgments will affect the members' judgment policies. To the extent that the chosen member's judgment policy matches the environment, the convergence will result in higher Gs and therefore higher correlational accuracy in the converging members' judgments. We do not wish to imply that these are the only mechanisms through which individual opinion revision can affect accuracy; they are simply some plausible and common ones.
The group must now combine the (revised) judgments of its members into a consensus group judgment. It is usually possible to describe the group judgment as a weighted combination of the members' judgments (Einhorn et si., 1977) . Process models take that observation a step beyond simple description. For example, the revision and weighting model (Sniezek & Henry, 1989 ) includes a weighting stage, during which the members' revised opinions are weighted and summed to produce a group judgment. Similarly, our model assumes that the group treats its members' judgments as cues to the true state of the criterion. A group's judgment policy will therefore consist of a weighted combination of those cues. In both models, the group renders a judgment by explicitly or implicitly weighting and adding its members' judgments.
Whatever the model, the group judgments resulting from a weighted additive process are likely to be more accurate than the constituent members' judgments, on average. The effects of the combination of member judgments will depend on the weights that are used by the group. The simplest case is that of equal weighting. Such a weighting scheme (with weights summing to one) is equivalent to treating the mean member judgment as the group judgment.
Equal weighting affects unsystematic errors; those errors tend to cancel each other out. In the case of a group judgment, the affected errors are distributed unsystematically across the judgments of different group members; in the discussion of member judgment revision, we focused on errors that are distributed unsystematically across a single member's multiple judgments. The cancellation of errors that is due to averaging will affect several parameters of the MSE decomposition. On average, the group's judgments will have less variability than the member judgments. The effect of a decrease in judgment variability depends on both the variability bias and the regressiveness of the member judgments. Averaging will also affect the mean bias of the judgments. With unsystematic errors, the mean biases of different members' judgments will tend to average to zero. Finally, an equally weighted additive combination can increase correlational accuracy through its effect on the matching parameter (G). Such an effect assumes that errors in the members' judgment policy weights are also unsystematic, whether because of inconsistencies between the weights or because of unequal distribution of cues. The group judgment policy that results from the combination of member judgment policies will be a closer match to the environment. The more unsystematic error in the members' judgments, the more improvement will result from the weighted additive combination. In the literature review section above, we argued that such a combination of members' judgments accounted for the vast majority of reported accuracy differences between groups and individuals.
The cancellation of systematic error, on the other hand, requires unequal weighting of member judgments. For example, if all of the members' judgments are positively biased relative to the criteria, then an equally weighted combination also has a positive mean bias. Weighting the least biased member's judgments most heavily reduces the mean bias of the group's judgments. Similarly, weighting the judgments of the member whose judgment policy most closely matches the environment (or the member who applies his or her model most consistently) will tend to improve the group's correlational accuracy. Of course, any such unequal weighting depends on the group's being able to determine which of its members is most accurate (Henry, 1995; Libby et al., 1987; Sniezek & Henry, 1989) .
Weighted additive combination models assume that the members' judgments (perhaps revised during group discussion) are the only information on which the group's judgments are based. Group discussion may influence the weights used to combine the members' judgments, such as by shedding light on relative member expertise, but it does not directly affect the group's judgments. A more complete model needs to account for the possibility of direct effects of discussion on the group's judgments (Gigone & Hastie, 1996) . Our model includes the original cue set that was available to the members, as well as the members' judgments themselves, as cues available to the group. That is, cues can have a direct impact on the group's judgments above and beyond their impacts on the members' judgments (Gigone & Hastie, 1993 , 1996 . For example, discussion of an unshared cue could lead to that cue directly influencing the group's judgments. Unless that unshared cue was always known by the same member, such an effect would not be represented by a model that included only member's judgments as inputs into the group's judgments.
Again, direct cue effects could influence group judgment accuracy in several different ways. The most likely change would be an improvement in the match of the group's judgment policy and the environment model (G). It is important to note that the presence of a direct cue effect implies a change in the group's judgment policy, where the latter predicts the group's judgments from only the set of informational cues. For example, if discussion of a previously unshared cue leads to that cue having a direct effect on the group's judgments, that cue's weight in the group judgment policy would increase. If that cue was a valid one (the cue is related to the criteria), then the group's G parameter would increase, as would correlational accuracy. The group could also explicitly change cue weights in the group's judgment policy. For example, during discussion the group might decide that a particular cue is important and therefore weight that cue more heavily than did any group member. Again, this type of direct cue impact would most directly affect correlational accuracy through the matching parameter (G). ReaganCirincione's (1994) effective group process interaction focused very directly on modifying group judgment policies; the groups in that study produced final judgment policies with higher G parameters than the mean initial member judgment policies.
Other group-level effects are not easily described in terms of weights on either members' judgments or cues. For example, we discussed earlier the finding in our example studies that the groups' judgments tend to be more variable than equally weighted members' judgments. Increased extremity could result from an increase in the magnitude of all the cue weights, of all the member judgment weights, or both. An explicit shifting of the mean group judgment might be another such effect. For example, the group might decide during discussion that all of its members had judged too low, across multiple judgments. Our model represents a generalized shift in the judgment mean as a shift in the intercept term of the group judgment policy. In terms of the MSE decomposition, it will affect the mean bias parameter. Thus, our group judgment process model can account for a wide range of group-level phenomena.
The quality of group decisions and judgments is an essential ingredient in democratic institutions and societies, but research on group judgment accuracy is stagnant. One reason for the slow progress is methodological; the best methods of analysis
are not consistently applied to data from empirical studies of group accuracy. Systematic, precise comparisons of individual and group accuracy from published reports are difficult or impossible in many cases. The methods we recommend represent the best practices of data analysis and reporting. Even where the specific methodological prescriptions from this review cannot be followed, the recommendations provide useful guides to improved research design and analysis. Better methods and analyses will help behavioral scientists, engineers, and policymakers to design and select group decision-making procedures that will increase efficiency, justice, and social welfare.
